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COMPELLED SELF-PUBLICATION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: A CONSISTENT EXCEPTION
TO THE DEFAMATION REQUIREMENT OF
PUBLICATION
Courts traditionally have protected the reputational interests that em-
ployees have in the statements that the employees' former employers make
about the employees' work performances.' Courts have held employers
liable for defamation if the employers communicated defamatory statements
that injured former employees' reputations to prospective employers of the
former employee. 2 Under the defamation cause of action,3 courts protect
1. See Chambers v. National Battery Co., 34 F. Supp. 834, 836 (W.D. Mo. 1940)
(former employer may be liable for statement that employee was careless in his work because
statement tended to prejudice employee's professional reputation); Louisville Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co. v. Ingle, 229 Ky. 578, -, 17 S.W.2d 709, 710 (1929) (former employer may be
liable for injuring employee's professional reputation by posting notice on company bulletin
board which implied that employer had discharged employee for drinking on job); Heitzeberg
v. Von Hoffman Press, 340 Mo. 265, _ , 100 S.W. 2d 307, 309 (1937) (former employer
may be liable for maligning employee's abilities as manager in letter to prospective employer);
see also Annotation, Statement With Reference to Discharge from Employment as Actionable
Per Se, 66 A.L.R. 1499, 1499-1507 (1930) (discussing statements that employers make about
reasons for former employees' discharges that may render employers liable for defamation).
2. See Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, -, 350 A.2d 688, 700 (1976)
(employer may be liable for defaming former employee by calling employee's current employer
and accusing former employee of theft); Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 1,
228 N.W.2d 737, 744 (1975) (former employer may be liable for defaming employee if former
employer made defamatory statements about employee to prospective employer).
3. See RiEsTATmEErr (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 558 (1977) (defining defamation cause of
action). A cause of action for defamation exists if a person makes a false statement that
defames another person and without privilege publishes the statement to a third party. Id.
Additionally, the plaintiff claiming defamation must prove that the person making the defam-
atory statement acted with some degree of fault and that the defamatory statement is either
actionable per se or that the statement's publication caused special harm to the plaintiff's
interest. Id. A defamatory communication tends to harm the reputation of another so as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him. Id. at § 559. Considerable confusion exists as to whether proof of falsity is
an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case of defamation or an affirmative defense that the
defendant must prove. Id. § 581A comment b. At common law, a plaintiff claiming defamation
had to allege in his complaint that the defamatory statement was false. Id. After the plaintiff
filed his complaint, however, the common law generally presumed falsity and placed on the
defendant the burden of proving the truth of the allegedly defamatory statement. See id.
(discussing how common law allocated burden of establishing truth or falsity in defamation
cause of action); see also Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 374 F.2d 442, 446
(2d Cir. 1967) (defendant has burden of proving truth of defamatory statement). Although
some courts at common law required defendants to prove the truth of defamatory statements,
the United States Supreme Court, in 1964, held that the first amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits courts from imposing liability on defendants who have not acted with
fault. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964); see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (states may not impose liability without fault upon
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an individual's interest in his reputation by holding liable the maker of
false statements that damage the individual's reputation. 4 Under traditional
defamation law, however, courts have determined that, for an originator
of a defamatory statement to injure another individual's reputation, the
originator must have communicated the defamatory statement to a third
party.5 Unless the originator of the defamatory statement communicates the
statement to a third party, the originator generally will not be liable for
defamation.6 An originator of a defamatory statement is not liable for
defamation defendants). The Supreme Court determined that plaintiffs in defamation actions
must show that a defendant acted with fault regarding the truth or falsity of defamatory
statements. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-280. By requiring
plaintiffs who bring suit for statements concerning issues of public concern and "public
official" plaintiffs to prove a media defendant's fault regarding the truth or falsity of
defamatory statements, the Supreme Court essentially shifted the burden of proof on the issue
to the plaintiff in those kind of cases. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347; New York Times, 376 U.S. at
279-280. Subsequently, the Supreme Court expressly has determined that in defamation claims
involving speech of public concern plaintiffs must prove the falsity of allegedly defamatory
statements to recover from media defendants. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (private figure plaintiff must show falsity of defamatory statements
if plaintiff seeks damages from media defendant for defendant's statements involving matters
of public concern). Whether the requirement that the plaintiff prove the falsity of allegedly
defamatory statements extends beyond claims involving media defendants and statements
involving matters of public concern remains unclear. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§
581A comment b, 613 comment j (1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has ruled that the first amendment requires all defamation plaintiffs to bear the burden
of proving the falsity of defamatory statements. Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,
642 F.2d 371, 376 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1130 (1981). But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §613 comment j (discussing problem that arises if law places burden of
proof on party asserting the negative).
4. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (state interest underlying
defamation law seeks to compensate individuals for reputational injury resulting from publi-
cation of defamatory falsehoods); Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th
Cir. 1965) (basis of defamation arises from harm that defamatory statements caused plaintiff's
reputation); Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, -, 93 A.2d 292, 295 (1952)
(injury to reputation of defamed person is essential element of slander claim); Gaetano v.
Sharon Herald Co., 426 Pa. 179, __, 231 A.2d 753, 755 (1967) (defamation cause of action
gives injured plaintiff public vindication of plaintiff's good name).
5. See, e.g., Washington Annapolis Hotel Co. v. Riddle, 171 F.2d 732, 737 (D.C. Cir.
1948) (defendant must communicate defamatory statements to third party before plaintiff may
recover for defamation); Wilcox v. Moon, 64 Vt. 450, -, 24 A. 244, 245 (1892) (courts
may not hold defendants liable for defaming plaintiffs unless defendants published defamatory
statement to third persons); W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 113, at 797 (1984)
(communication to third party is essential to impose defamation liability on defendant); 50
Am. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 146, at 652-53 (1970) (defendant must publish defamatory
statements to third parties before defamed person may recover for defamation).
6. See, e.g., Gelhaus v. Eastern Airlines, 194 F.2d 774, 777, (5th Cir. 1952) (if only
plaintiff heard defendant utter defamatory words, defendant did not "publish" words so as
to create liability for defamation); Lally v. Cash, 18 Ariz. 574, -, 164 P. 443, 446 (1917)
(to recover damages for defamation, plaintiff must show that someone other than plaintiff
read defamatory article); Yousling v. Dare, 122 Iowa 539, -, 98 N.W. 371, 371 (1904)
(absent proof that third person read defamatory letters, proof that defendant sent defamatory
letters directly to plaintiff is not sufficient publication to support civil defamation action). The
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defamation if he communicates the statement only to the subject of the
statement.
7
Some courts recently have recognized an exception to the defamation
publication requirement in cases in which an employer, in making a defam-
atory statement about an employee, communicated the statement only to
the employee." These courts, recognizing the "compelled self-publication"
doctrine, have determined that a plaintiff employee may satisfy the defa-
mation publication requirement if the employee shows that the employer
wrongfully dismissed the employee and that the employee, under compul-
sion, subsequently had to inform prospective employers of the reason for
his dismissal.9 These courts, in recognizing that an employee may recover
damages for defamation after the employee publishes the employer's defam-
atory statements, have acknowledged that the reasons which an employer
gives an employee for the employee's dismissal may affect the employee's
ability to obtain subsequent employment.' 0 By giving an employee a defam-
atory reason for the employee's dismissal, an employer can injure the
employee's employment prospects if the employee has to repeat the defam-
atory statements regarding the reason for his dismissal to prospective em-
ployers." Recognition of the compelled self-publication exception to the
basis for a defamation claim is injury to a defamed person's reputation, which courts measure
by the esteem in which others hold the defamed person. See Fry v. McCord Bros., 95 Tenn.
678, -, 33 S.W. 568, 571-72 (1895) (gravamen of civil defamation action is pecuniary
damage to character or credit of defamed party, and only publication that defamer makes to
third persons can affect party's character or credit); see also REsTAEmETrr (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 577 comment b (1977) (defamed individual's reputation cannot suffer injury unless third
person learns of defamatory communication).
7. See supra note 6 (discussing defendant's lack of liability for defamation if defendant
does not publish defamatory statements to third party).
8. See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 798, 168 Cal. Rptr.
89, 94 (1980) (recognizing exception to defamation publication requirement in situation in
which employer can foresee that discharged employee must repeat employer's defamatory
statements); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 840-41, 38 S.E.2d 306, 308
(Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (same); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, -, 168 N.W.2d
389, 405-406 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (same); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the
United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986) (same).
9. See supra note 8 (listing decisions in which courts have recognized compelled self-
publication doctrine).
10. See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 797-98, 168 Cal.
Rptr 89, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (employer is liable for employee's republication of defamatory
reasons for employee's dismissal because of strong causal link between employer's original
publication and employee's injurious republication); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga.
App. 839, 840, 38 S.E.2d 306, 308 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (causal relation between original libel
and necessary injurious republication may make employer liable for employee's republication
of employer's libelous statements); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, -, 168
N.W.2d 389, 405-406 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (same); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y
of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986) (doctrine of compelled self-publication
holds employer who originated defamatory statements liable for any injury that employee's
foreseeable republication causes).
11. See supra note 10 (listing court decisions that recognized causal connection between
employer's stated reasons for employee's dismissal and employee's ability to find subsequent
employment).
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defamation publication requirement protects an employee from an injury
for which his employer is responsible and that the employee is powerless to
prevent.' 2 If courts limit the exception to situations in which a prospective
employer actually compels an employee to disclose a previous employer's
defamatory statements about the employee, the compelled self-publication
exception affords protection to employees without unjustifiably increasing
employer liability. 3 Additionally, employers already have a strong protection
against defamation liability because courts consider any communication
between an employer and an employee conditionally privileged unless the
employer maliciously communicates the statement.' 4 Recognition of com-
-pelled self-publication enables a wrongfully discharged employee to state a
prima facie case of defamation against his former employer by showing
that the employer's defamatory statements caused the injuries that the
employee suffered.'
5
Although some courts have recognized the validity of the self-publication
doctrine, most courts, acknowledging that defamation law seeks to protect
an individual's reputational interests, have required a plaintiff claiming
defamation to show that a defendant published a defamatory statement to
a third person.' 6 Courts generally have recognized that the communication
of defamatory statements only to the defamed person is not sufficient
publication to support a defamation claim because, without reaching a third
party, the defamatory statements cannot injure the defamed person's rep-
utation.' 7 Additionally, courts have refused to hold a defamer liable if,
after he communicates defamatory statements to the subject of the defam-
atory remarks, the subject voluntarily discloses the defamatory statements
12. See infra notes 101-109 and accompanying text (discussing former employer's re-
sponsibility for employee's inability to obtain work and employee's inability to avoid injury).
13. See infra notes 126-128 and accompanying text (discussing how proper limitations
on compelled self-publication exception would prevent employees from bringing warrantless
claims against former employers and ensure that employees would mitigate damages).
14. See infra notes 130-141 and accompanying text (discussing employers' conditional
privilege to defame employees); see also 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel and Slander §273, at 791 (1970).
15. See infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing long-recognized exception to
defamation publication requirement that allows plaintiff to establish publication if defendant
communicated defamatory statements only to plaintiff and plaintiff communicated statements
to third persons).
16. See, e.g., Washington Annapolis Hotel Co. v. Riddle, 171 F.2d 732, 737 (D.C. Cir.
1948) (defendant must communicate defamatory statements to third party before plaintiff may
recover for defamation); Wilcox v. Moon, 64 Vt. 450, __ , 24 A. 244, 245 (1892) (courts
may not hold defendants liable for defaming plaintiffs unless defendants published defamatory
statement to third persons); KEETON, supra note 5, § 113 at 797 (communication to third party
is essential to impose defamation liability on defendant); 50 AM. JuR. 2D Libel and Slander §
146, at 652-53 (1970) (defendant must publish defamatory statements to third parties before
defamed person may recover for defamation).
17. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing common-law requirement that
defendant must communicate defamatory statements about plaintiff to third party to be liable
for defamation).
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to third parties. 8 For example, in Shepard v. Lamphier 9 the Supreme Court
of the State of New York, adopting the defamation common-law publication
requirement, refused to hold a defendant liable for defamation after the
plaintiff had disclosed to third parties defamatory statements that the
defendant had communicated only to the plaintiff.20 In Shepard the defen-
dant anonymously sent the plaintiff an allegedly defamatory letter and asked
the plaintiff to keep the contents of the letter confidential. 2' The plaintiff,
indignant over the letter's possible defamatory inferences, showed the letter
to the postal authorities and, with the authorities' assistance, discovered the
defendant's identity.22 The Shepard court, in considering whether the defen-
dant had "published" the letter for purposes of defamation liability, rec-
ognized that only the plaintiff publicly had communicated the contents of
the allegedly defamatory letter.23 The Shepard court explained that publi-
cation could not occur until defamatory matter had been communicated to
a third person. 24 The New York court, however, further explained that if
only the defamed person communicated the defamatory matter to third
persons, the defamed person, not the originator of the defamatory state-
ments, had published the defamation. 2 The Shepard court recognized that
the requirement that the originator publish the defamatory statements to
third persons exists because courts intend for the defamation cause of action
to remedy the injury that a defamer, by publishing defamatory statements,
causes to a defamed person's reputation. 26 The New York court reasoned
that, because the defamed person could not have suffered any reputational
18. See Shoemaker v. Friedberg, 80 Cal. App. 2d 911, -, 183 P.2d 318, 322 (1947)
(defendant is not liable for defamation if plaintiff disclosed to third parties contents of letter
stating that plaintiff had venereal disease); Shepard v. Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498, 503, 146
N.Y.S. 745, 748 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914) (plaintiff cannot recover for injuries that plaintiff
created by making defamatory comments public); Sylvis v. Miller, 96 Tenn. 94, -, 33 S.W.
921, 922 (1896) (defendant is not liable for publication of defamatory letter mailed to plaintiff
because only plaintiff exhibited contents of letter to third persons).
19. 84 Misc. 498, 146 N.Y.S. 745 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
20. Shepard v. Lamphier, 84 Misc. 498, 503, 146 N.Y.S. 745, 748 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
21. Id. at 499, 146 N.Y.S. at 746. In Shepard v. Lamphier the defendant, in the letter
that he sent to the plaintiff, offered the plaintiff five dollars and suggested that the plaintiff
meet the defendant for a "good time." Id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had
defamed the plaintiff by implying that the plaintiff was a woman of immoral character who
would consort with the defendant for monetary gain. Id. at 499-500, 146 N.Y.S. at 746. The
Shepard court, however, determined that the letter did not charge the plaintiff with past or
present immoral conduct, but only offered a mere proposition for future indiscretions. Id. at
501-02, 146 N.Y.S. at 747-48. The Shepard court, therefore, concluded that the contents of
the letter were not defamatory. Id. at 502, 146 N.Y.S. at 748. Although the Shepard court
could have sustained the defendant's demurrer solely on the grounds that the defendant had
not defamed the plaintiff, the court nonetheless chose to address the issue of whether the
defendant had "published" the letter to third persons. Id. at 503, 146 N.Y.S. at 748.
22. Id. at 500, 146 N.Y.S. at 746-747.
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injury until a third person learned of the defamatory matter, the plaintiff
could have prevented any reputational injury by choosing not to disclose
the contents of the allegedly defamatory letter to a third party.27 The
Shepard court concluded that, because only the defamed person had pub-
lished the defamatory matter to third persons, the defamed person could
not complain of injuries that the defamed person had created by making
the defamation public.
2
Although the common-law publication requirement generally requires
that a defamer publish defamatory statements to a third party before the
defamer can be liable for defamation, some courts have developed an
exception to the traditional common-law publication requirement. 29 Under
the exception to the defamation publication requirement, some courts have
recognized that if an originator of a defamatory communication intends or
has reason to suppose that third persons will learn of the contents of the
communication in the ordinary course of events, the originator is responsible
for the publication of the defamatory statements to the third persons.
3 0
These courts have based their recognition of this exception to the publication
requirement on findings that the originator's defamatory statements caused
the injuries that the defamed person suffered. 3' For example, in Hedgpeth
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Rumney v. Worthley, 186 Mass. 144, __, 71 N.E. 316, 316-17 (1904)
(recognizing exception to defamation publication requirement); Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 183
N.C. 309, -, IIl S.E. 517, 519-20 (1922) (same); Bretz v. Mayer, I Ohio Misc. 59,
203 N.E.2d 665, 669-71 (1963) (same).
30. See, e.g., Rumney v. Worthley, 186 Mass. 144, __, 71 N.E. 316, 316-17 (1904)
(because defendant knew that plaintiff's daughter often opened and read letters addressed to
plaintiff, defendant reasonably could foresee that daughter would open and read defamatory
letter that defendant sent to plaintiff); Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, -, III S.E.
517, 520 (1922) (defendant could have foreseen that, as natural and probable result of sending
letter to fourteen-year-old plaintiff threatening plaintiff with prosecution for theft, plaintiff
would show letter to his older brother to seek advice); Bretz v. Mayer, 1 Ohio Misc. 59, 203
N.E.2d 665, 670-71 (1965) (defendant reasonably could foresee that plaintiff, a minister, would
show letter threatening plaintiff with legal action to others with interest in minister's church);
see also Annotation, Libel and Slander: Publication by Accidental Communication, or Com-
munication Only to Plaintiff, 92 A.L.R.2D 219, 229-31 (1963) (discussing courts' recognition
of "reasonably foreseeable republication" exception to defamation publication requirement);
Annotation, Libel and Slander: Communication of Defamatory Matter Only to Person Defamed
as a Publication Which Will Support a Civil Action, 24 A.L.R. 237, 237-46 (1923) (same). If
a reasonable person would recognize that a defamer's action creates an unreasonable risk that
the defamatory matter will reach a third person, the defamer's action becomes a "negligent
communication" that amounts to a publication. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577
comment k (1977).
31. See Allen v. Wortham, 89 Ky. 485, -, 13 S.W. 73, 74 (1890) (if defendant, in
sending defamatory letter to illiterate plaintiffs, knew that someone would have to read letter
to plaintiffs, defendant published defamation by proximately causing plaintiffs to show letter
to third parties); Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, -, 111 S.E. 517, 519-20 (1922)
(since defendant must have foreseen that plaintiff, because of his immaturity, would reveal
contents of defamatory letter to plaintiff's elders, defendant was liable for publishing defam-
atory statements because defendant's sending of letter proximately caused publication).
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v. Coleman 2 the Supreme Court for the State of North Carolina considered
whether a plaintiff could recover for defamation if only the plaintiff had
communicated the defendant's defamatory statements to third persons. 33 In
Hedgpeth the defendant sent to a fourteen-year-old boy, the plaintiff, a
letter in which the defendant accused the plaintiff of theft and threatened
the plaintiff with prosecution. 34 The plaintiff, seeking advice, showed the
letter to his older brother who then showed the letter to their father.35 The
defendant claimed that he could not be liable for defamation because the
plaintiff voluntarily had published the letter to third persons.3 6 The Hedgpeth
court determined that the plaintiff had not voluntarily disclosed the contents
of the defamatory letter to third persons because the plaintiff's circumstances
had forced the plaintiff to show the letter to his brother. 37 The Hedgpeth
court reasoned that the defendant reasonably must have foreseen that,
because of the plaintiff's youth and immaturity, the plaintiff would seek
advice if threatened with criminal prosecution.38 The Hedgpeth court deter-
mined that, because the defendant must have foreseen that threatening a
young boy with criminal prosecution would compel the boy to disclose the
letter to third persons, the defendant, by sending the letter to the plaintiff,
proximately caused the publication of the letter to third parties.
3 9
While courts have recognized the foreseeable republication exception to
the defamation publication requirement for nearly one hundred years,
4°
courts traditionally have not applied the exception to situations in which a
discharged employee discloses to prospective employers defamatory state-
ments that the employee's former employer made in discharging the em-
ployee. 4' In the context of employment termination, a defamatory
32. 183 N.C. 309, 111 S.E. 517 (1922).
33. Hedgpeth v. Coleman, 183 N.C. 309, , 111 S.E. 517, 519 (1922)
34. Id. at , 111 S.E. at 518.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 111 S.E. at 519.
37. Id. at , 111 S.E. at 520. The Hedgpeth court recognized that, ifa defamed
person, out of necessity, disclosed defamatory matter to third persons, the originator of the
defamatory matter could be liable for defamation if the originator had reason to know of the
circumstances that made the plaintiff's disclosure necessary. Id. The North Carolina court
reasoned that necessity could arise if circumstances compelled the defamed person to repeat
defamatory statements to third persons. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Allen v. Wortham, 89 Ky. 495, -, 13 S.W. 73, 74 (1890) (recognizing
exception to general publication requirement in situations in which defamer could foresee that
defamed person necessarily would disclose defamatory statements to third parties); Schmuck
v. Hill 2 Neb. Unoff. 79, -, 96 N.W. 158, 158 (1901) (recognizing exception to general
publication requirement in situations in which defendant intended that third parties read
defamatory statements about plaintiff).
41. See Sarratore v. Longview Van Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (N.D. Ind. 1987)
(recognizing that Indiana courts had not adopted compelled self-publication doctrine in
employee discharge context); Lunz v. Neuman, 48 Wash. 2d 26, -, 290 P.2d 697, 701-02
(1955) (failing to address foreseeable republication exception to defamation publication re-
quirement in employee discharge context).
1988]
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communication indicates a former employee's unfitness for a particular
position or otherwise adversely affects his job prospects.4 2 Traditionally,
however, courts have held employers liable for statements that defame
employees only if the employers made the statements to a third party. 43
Employers have argued that the foreseeable republication exception should
not apply to employment termination situations because recognition of the
exception will expose employers to increased and unwarranted defamation
liability. 44 Additionally, employers have argued that the recognition of the
foreseeable republication exception to the publication requirement will re-
duce the level of communication between employers and employees because




Although employers have argued against extending the foreseeable re-
publication exception to the publication requirement to employment dis-
charge situations, the Supreme Court for the State of Minnesota in Lewis
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States46 applied a form
of the foreseeable republication exception to employment discharge situa-
tions by recognizing the doctrine of compelled self-publication.4 7 The Lewis
42. See M.F. Patterson Dental Supply Co. v. Wadley, 401 F.2d 167, 170 (10th Cir.
1968) (letters that injured plaintiff's ability to earn livelihood and that caused employers to
refrain from hiring plaintiff were defamatory); Washer v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 21 Cal. 2d 822, __, 136 P.2d 297, 300 (1943) (defamatory words may tend to injure
defamed person in his profession, trade, or business); Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Ingle, 229 Ky. 578, -, 17 S.W.2d 709, 710 (1929) (words that impute employee's unfitness
to perform employment duties or that prejudice plaintiff in plaintiff's profession or trade are
defamatory per se).
43. See Lunz v. Neuman, 48 Wash. 2d 26, -, 290 P.2d 697,701-02 (1955) (employer
is not liable for defamation if discharged employee voluntarily discloses to prospective employers
allegedly defamatory reasons that employer gave to employee for employee's discharge); see
also infra note 116 (discussing Lunz decision).
44. See New Twist to Defamation Suits, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1987, at 17 [hereinafter New
Twist] (discussing employers' argument that recognition of compelled self-publication doctrine
exposes employers to increased defamation liability); Fired Employees Turn the Reason For
Dismissal Into a Legal Weapon, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1986, at 33, col. 4 (same).
45. See New Twist, supra note 44, at 17 (discussing likelihood that, in response to
compelled self-publication doctrine, employers will cease informing employees of reasons for
employees' dismissals).
46. 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
47. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876
(Minn. 1986). The compelled self-publication exception to the defamation publication require-
ment applies to employment discharge situations if circumstances compel a discharged employee
to repeat to prospective employers defamatory statements that the employee's former employer
made in discharging the employee. See id., 389 N.W.2d at 888 (compelled self-publication
doctrine applies if circumstances compel plaintiff to repeat defamatory statements to third
person and defendant can foresee compulsion). The foreseeable republication exception to the
defamation publication requirement, however, may apply in situations in which no compulsion
is present. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that foreseeable republication
exception applies in any situation in which the originator of defamatory statements reasonably
can foresee that plaintiff will disclose defendant's defamatory statements to third person). The
compelled self-publication exception, therefore, is a subset of the traditional foreseeable
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court considered whether an employer can be liable for defaming an
employee if only the employee has published defamatory communications
to a third party. 48 In Lewis the defendant employer, Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States ("Equitable Life"), terminated the employment
of four plaintiffs for "gross insubordination" after the plaintiff employees
refused to alter expense reports for expenses that the employees had incurred
reasonably and in good faith.4 9 Although the company never communicated
the reason for the plaintiffs' dismissals to anyone other than the four
plaintiffs, prospective employers, in job interviews following the plaintiffs'
firings, asked the plaintiffs for the reasons that the plaintiffs had left their
positions at Equitable Life.5 0 The plaintiffs informed prospective employers
that Equitable Life had fired the plaintiffs for gross insubordination.5' As
a result, only one of the four plaintiffs was able to obtain employment
after telling the truth about her dismissal from Equitable Life
2
republication exception. Compare Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886-88 (illustrating compelled self-
publication exception) with Rumney v. Worthley, 186 Mass. 144, -, 71 N.E. 316, 316-17
(1904) (illustrating foreseeable republication exception).
48. Id. at 886.
49. Id. at 880-81. In Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States the
defendant, Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (Equitable Life), had hired
the four plaintiffs as dental claim approvers in the company's St. Paul office. Id. at 880.
After a short time, the company requested that the plaintiffs travel to Pittsburgh to assist the
company's Pittsburgh office. Id. As the plaintiffs prepared to travel to Pittsburgh, a supervisor
gave them incorrect and incomplete instructions concerning reimbursement for travel expenses.
Id. at 880-81. Upon the plaintiffs' return, company management instructed the plainfiffs to
fill out detailed expense reports for their trip. Id. at 881. After the plaintiffs submitted their
reports, company management requested that the plaintiffs remove certain entries from the
plaintiffs' expense reports because the entries involved expenses not recoverable under company
policy. Id. Although the plaintiffs contended that the company supervisor had indicated before
the plaintiffs' departure for Pittsburgh that these excluded expenses were recoverable, the
plaintiffs complied with management's request. Id. After the plaintiffs had complied with the
request, however, the company management again instructed the plaintiffs to change their
reports and, in effect, to lower each report by two hundred dollars. Id. After the management
had requested that the plaintiffs lower their reports by two hundred dollars, the company
finally gave the plaintiffs correct written guidelines for completing expense reports. Id. The
company made three additional requests to the plaintiffs to revise their expense reports,
including a request from a manager at the company's regional office. Id. The plaintiffs refused
to change their reports, arguing that they had incurred the reported expenses in good faith
and according to the instructions they had received before the trip. Id. Subsequently, the
regional office ordered the St. Paul office manager to fire the four plaintiffs, but not until
the manager had collected money from two of the plaintiffs who had agreed to make a refund
to the company. Id. The office manager asked the plaintiffs once more to change their reports,
and, upon their refusals, fired the plaintiffs for gross insubordination. Id.
50. Id. at 882. In Lewis the defendant, Equitable Life, had a policy of giving to inquiring
prospective employers only the dates of employment and final job title of a former employee
unless the former employee, in writing, expressly had authorized Equitable Life to release
additional information regarding the employee's employment with Equitable Life. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. One of the plaintiffs in Lewis, in attempting to find a new job after Equitable
Life had fired her, misrepresented to a prospective employer her reason for leaving Equitable
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The 'plaintiffs in Lewis brought suit against the defendant, claiming that
Equitable Life had defamed the plaintiffs by firing the plaintiffs for gross
insubordination. 3 Equitable Life denied that it could be liable for defa-
mation because Equitable Life had not published the allegedly defamatory
statements about the plaintiffs to any third parties. 54 Equitable Life argued
that, because only the plaintiffs had published the defendant's allegedly
defamatory statements to third parties, the plaintiffs could not satisfy the
common-law defamation publication requirement. 55 The plaintiffs, however,
argued that, even though the defendant had not published the defamatory
statements to a third party, the defendant was liable for defamation because
Equitable Life knew that the plaintiffs would have to repeat the reason for
their dismissals to prospective employers.5 6 The Lewis court recognized that,
generally, a defendant will not be liable for defamation unless the defendant
communicates a defamatory statement to a third party.57 The Lewis court,
however, acknowledged that, even if the originator of a defamatory state-
ment does not publish the statement to a third party, circumstances may
compel a defamed person to reveal a defamatory statement to a third
person.58 The Lewis court determined that a prospective employer's request
to a fired employee for the reason that the employee left his previous job
could compel the employee to reveal the reason for the employee's dismissal,
even if the reason was defamatory.5 9 The Lewis court reasoned that a
defendant employer, as originator of defamatory statements, could foresee
that prospective employers would ask a fired employee for the reason that
the employee had left his previous employment position 0 The Minnesota
court determined that, because an employer could foresee the circumstances
Life. Id. A second plaintiff left blank the space on a job application that requested the
plaintiff to disclose the reasons that she had left her last job. Id. Neither of these employees
had been able to obtain employment until resorting to dishonest actions. Id. A third plaintiff
could find only part-time work after her dismissal from Equitable Life. Id.
53. Id. at 880. In addition to claiming that the defendant, Equitable Life, had defamed
them, the plaintiffs in Lewis claimed that Equitable Life had discharged them in breach of
the plaintiffs' employment contracts. Id.
54. Id. at 886.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 880.
57. Id. at 886.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 888. The Lewis court determined that the prospective employers' requests for
the reasons that the plaintiffs had left their previous employment positions compelled the
plaintiff employees to reveal the defamatory reasons that the defendant employer had given
them. Id. The Minnesota court reasoned that the plaintiffs, in interviewing for new employment
positions, reasonably had to explain why they had left their previous jobs. Id. The Lewis
court recognized that, when asked why the employees had left their last jobs, the employees
could have answered that their employer had fired them for gross insubordination or could
have lied about the reasons for their dismissals. Id. The Lewis court expressly determined
that, since fabrication was not an acceptable alternative to revealing the reasons for the
employees' dismissals, the prospective employers' requests for the reasons that the plaintiffs
had left their last jobs compelled the plaintiffs to repeat the defamatory statements. Id.
60. Id.
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that could compel a fired employee to repeat an employer's defamatory
statement regarding the employee's dismissal, a defendant employer could
be liable for defamation even if the employer himself had not published
the defamatory statement to a prospective employer or other third party.
61
The Lewis court, considering the facts in Lewis, expressly determined that
prospective employers had compelled the discharged employees to repeat
Equitable Life's defamatory statements and that the employees were unable
to obtain new employment because of Equitable Life's communication of
the defamatory statements to the employees.6 2 Accordingly, the Lewis court
concluded that the defendant was liable for defamation even though the
defendant had communicated the statements only to the defamed employ-
ees.
63
Although the Lewis decision appears novel, other courts prior to the
Lewis decision have allowed discharged employees to recover in defamation
actions against former employers even though the former employers never
had published defamatory statements about the employees to prospective
employers.Y For example, the Court of Appeals for the State of Georgia,
in Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett,65 recognized that an employer who makes
a defamatory statement about a discharged employee only to the employee
may be liable for defamation if government regulations compel the ehployee
to disclose the defamatory statements to prospective employers.6 The Co-
lonial Stores court considered whether a defendant employer could be liable
for defamation if a plaintiff employee communicated to prospective em-
ployers defamatory statements that the defendant had made about the




64. See, e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 797-98, 168
Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (1980) (employer may be liable for defamatory statements that employer
makes only to discharged employee if employee repeats defamatory statements to prospective
employers); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 840-41, 38 S.E.2d 306, 308
(Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (same); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, __ 168 N.W.2d
389, 405-406 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (same); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake, 606
S.W.2d 696, 701-02 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (same).
65. 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946).
66. Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 840-41, 38 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1946).
67. Id. at -, 38 S.E.2d at 307. In Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett the Court of
Appeals for the State of Georgia recognized that War Manpower Commission regulations
covered the terms of the plaintiff's employment. Id. at -, 38 S.E.2d at 307. Under War
Manpower Commission regulations, employers, upon discharging an employee, were to give
the employee either a statement of availability or a restricted statement of availability. Id. If
an employee received a restricted statement of availability, the employee could not apply for
new employment unless he received a referral from the United States Employment Service. Id.
Furthermore, Commission regulations forbade employers from making any comments in
restricted statements of availability that would prejudice former employees' employment
prospects. Id. at -, 38 S.E.2d at 308. The regulations also stated that a prospective
employer could not hire a job applicant unless the applicant produced for the prospective
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plaintiff's employment, gave the plaintiff a certificate of separation ("the
certificate"), which was a document that the government required employers
to give to discharged employees.68 In violation of governmental regulations,
the defendant wrote on the certificate that the plaintiff had acted with
"improper conduct toward fellow employees," knowing that the same
government regulations would compel the plaintiff to present the certificate
to prospective employers. 69 Although the Colonial Stores plaintiff attempted
to find other employment, prospective employers refused to hire the plaintiff
because of the employer's written statement that the employer had fired the
plaintiff for improper conduct.
70
At trial the defendant in Colonial Stores argued that, since the defendant
never had communicated the information on the certificate to anyone except
the plaintiff, the defendant had not published the allegedly defamatory
statement. 7' The Colonial Stores court acknowledged that publication of
defamatory matter is necessary for recovery in a defamation claim and that,
generally, publication does not occur if a defamed person communicates
defamatory matter to third persons. 72 The Colonial Stores court, however,
recognized an exception to the general rule that publication does not occur
if a defamed person communicates defamatory -matter to third persons.
73
The Georgia court explained that, in situations in which a defamed person
discloses defamatory statements to a third person, the causal relationship
between the original defamation and the subsequent disclosure determines
whether publication has occurred. 74 The Colonial Stores court recognized
that publication may occur if a defamer intends or has reason to believe
that the defamatory communication from the defamer to the defamed person
will come to the attention of third persons.7 5 The Colonial Stores court
determined that this exception to the publication requirement especially
applied in situations in which a defamed person must disclose another's
defamatory statements. 76 After finding that the plaintiff's presentments of
the certificate to prospective employers were necessary and that the defen-
dant employer knew that government regulations would require the plaintiff
emIoyer a statement of availability from the applicant's prior employer or a United States
Employment Service referral card. Id. at A , 38 S.E.2d at 307. The defendant employer
issued certificates of separation, which were the equivalents of restricted statements of avail-
ability, to its discharged employees. Id.
68. Id. at __, 38 S.E.2d at 308.
69. Id.
70. Id. at __, 38 S.E.2d at 307-308. The Colonial Stores court determined that
prospective employers refrained from hiring the plaintiff solely because the defendant had
written a defamatory statement on the plaintiff's certificate of separation. Id. at -, 38
S.E.2d at 308.







to make the presentments, the Colonial Stores court reasoned that the
presentments were publications for which the defendant was liable.7 The
Colonial Stores court, therefore, concluded that, if an employee, pursuant
to a statutory requirement, must inform prospective employers of the false
and defamatory reason that he left his previous employment, his former
employer may be liable for publication of the statement if the former
employer knew that the employee would have to repeat the statement to
prospective employers.
7
Although the Colonial Stores court determined that an employer could
be liable for defamation if government regulations foreseeably compelled a
defamed employee to republish the employer's defamatory statements, the
Court of Appeals for the State of Michigan in Grist v Upjohn Co.
7 19
77. Id. at _ 38 S.E.2d at 308.
78. Id. Following its decision in Colonial Stores, the Court of Appeals for the State of
Georgia in Brantley v. Heller significantly limited the impact of the Colonial Stores decision.
Compare Brantley v. Heller, 101 Ga. App. 16, 21, 112 S.E.2d 685, 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960)
(dictum) (unless government regulations require discharged employee to disclose to prospective
employers former employer's defamatory statement, discharged employee may not recover for
defamation) witlh Colonial Stares, 73 Ga- App. at 840-41, 38 S.E.2d at 307-0 (if government
regulations foreseeably require discharged employee to disclose to prospective employers former
employer's defamatory statement, former employer may be liable for defamation). The Brantley
court considered whether an employer could be liable for defamation if a discharged employee
exhibited an allegedly defamatory separation notice to prospective employers. Brantley 101 Ga.
App. at 16-17, 112 S.E. at 686. In Brantley the defendant employer, complying with a state
statute, delivered to the discharged employee a separation notice that discussed the reason for
the employee's dismissal. Id. at 20, 112 S.E.2d at 688. The employee alleged that he was
forced to show the separation notice to prospective employers because prospective employers
would not hire him unless the employee revealed the reasons that the employee left his previous
job. Id. at 16-17, 112 S.E.2d at 687. The Brantley court determined that the allegedly
defamatory statement was absolutely privileged because the defendant made the statement in
compliance with a valid public regulation. Id. at 20-21, 112 S.E.2d at 689.
The Brantley court distinguished Colonial Stores by stating that, while federal regulations
required the plaintiff in Colonial Stores to present his certificate of separation to prospective
employers, no regulations required the Brantley plaintiff to exhibit the separation notice. Id.;
see Colonial Stores, 73 Ga. App. at 841, 38 S.E.2d at 307-08 (if government regulations
foreseeably require discharged employee to disclose former employer's defamatory statement
to prospective employers, former employer may be liable for defamation). The Brantley court,
therefore, refused to hold a former employer liable for an employee's publications to prospective
employers of the reason that the former employer discharged the employee. Brantley, 101 Ga.
App. at 21, 112 S.E.2d at 689. By holding that the plaintiff did not have to exhibit the
separation notice and, therefore, did not have to tell prospective employers the reason that
his former employer had fired him, the Brantley court implied that, absent a federal or state
regulation to the contrary, job applicants may lie to prospective employers about the reasons
for leaving their previous employment Id. at 21, 112 S.E.2d at 689.-
While the Brantley court's determination concerning publication was dictum, the Georgia
Court of Appeals in Sigmon v. Womack held that publication does not occur if a discharged
employee voluntarily discloses to prospective employers that a previous, employer had fired the
employee from a previous job. See Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 49, 279 S.E.2d
254, 257 (1981) (if government regulations did not require discharged employee to disclose
former employer's defamatory statement to prospective employers, discharged employee's
voluntary disclosure did not constitute publication of defamation).
79. 16 Mich. App. 452, 168 N.W.2d 389 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
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determined that, even if no statute compelled a dismissed employee to
communicate defamatory reasons for his dismissal, an employer could be
liable for defamation if the employer could foresee that the dismissed
employee would republish the employer's defamatory statements.80 The Grist
court considered whether a plaintiff successfully could recover for defa-
mation even though the defendant had made the allegedly defamatory
statements only to the plaintiff."A In Grist a plaintiff employee claimed that
her former employer had given false and defamatory reasons for her
dismissal.8 2 In considering whether to hold the employer responsible for
publication, the Grist court recognized the existence of an exception to the
general rule that the communication of defamatory matter only to the
defamed person does not constitute publication.8 3 The Michigan court
explained that publication may occur if the originator of defamatory state-
ments intends or has reason to believe that, as a natural consequence of
the originator's actions, the defamatory statements will come to the knowl-
edge of some third person. 4 The Grist court concluded that this exception
could apply in the employment discharge context if an employer, in termi-
nating an employee's employment, communicated a defamatory statement
regarding the employee's work performance only to the dismissed em-
ployee. 8 The Grist decision implies that employers should expect discharged
employees to inform prospective employers of the reasons that employers
gave for the employees' dismissals from their previous employment.
8 6
Like the Grist court, the Court of Appeals for the State of California
in McKinney v. County of Santa Clara8 7 recognized in employment termi-
nation situations a compelled self-publication exception to the defamation
80. Grist v. Upjohn, 16 Mich. App. 452, , 168 N.W.2d 389, 405-06 (1969).
81. Id. at , 168 N.W.2d at 405. In Grist v. Upjohn Co. a plaintiff originally
brought suit against her former employer for slander and for wrongful interference. .Id. at
__ , 168 N.W.2d at 391. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $47,000. Id.
The trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of juror
misconduct. Id. The trial court determined that one of the jurors had failed to disclose that
a previous employer had fired the juror for cause. Id. The plaintiff appealed the trial court's
decision to grant the defendant's motion for a new trial. Id. The defendant in Grist cross-
appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to find publication even if
the defendant had made the slanderous statements only to the plaintiff. Id. at -, 168
N.W.2d at 405. Although the Michigan Court of Appeals did not find error in the trial court's
publication instruction, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial because
of juror misconduct and because of an erroneous jury instruction on the degree of fault
necessary to find the defendant liable for defamation. Id. at -, 168 N.W.2d at 408.
82. Id.
83. Id. at , 168 N.W.2d at 405; see Annotation, Libel and Slander: Communication
of Defamatory Matter Only to Person Defamed as a Publication Which Will Support a Civil
Action, 24 A.L.R. 237, 242-244 (1923) (discussing general common-law publication rule and
exception to general rule).
84. Grist, 16 Mich. App. at -, 168 N.W.2d at 405.
85. Id. at _ , 168 N.W.2d at 405-406.
86. Id.
87. 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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publication requirement.88 In McKinney the plaintiff, while seeking employ-
ment after the county had fired him, repeated to prospective employers
certain defamatory statements that the defendant made in dismissing the
plaintiff."9 The McKinney plaintiff asserted that the defendant, as the
originator of defamatory statements, should be liable for any foreseeable
repetitions of the statements.9 The defendant, however, argued that the
court should not allow the plaintiff to recover for injuries that the plaintiff
caused himself by making public the defamatory statements. 9' The McKinney
court agreed with the plaintiff that a job applicant is under a strong
compulsion to repeat the defamatory reasons for his dismissal to prospective
employers. 92 The California court further explained that an employer should
know that a discharged employee might be compelled to repeat to third
parties the defamatory statements that the employer makes in discharging
the employee. 9 The McKinney court determined that an employer should
be liable for defamation if the employer could foresee that circumstances
would compel a former employee to disclose to third parties the defamatory
statements that the employer made about the employee.9 4 The McKinney
court based the employer's liability on the strong causal link between the
employer's defamatory statements and the injury to the employee that the
employee's republication of those statements causes. 95 The MeKinney court
determined that the defamed person's communication of the defamatory
statement to prospective employers does not weaken the causal link between
the employer's defamatory statement and the employee's injury.9
Although the courts that have applied the compelled self-publication
doctrine to employee discharge situations have used different terms to
describe this exception to the publication requirement, the differences be-
tween the decisions appear minor.97 Each court recognized the general
defamation requirement that publication does not occur if the originator of
defamatory statements communicates the statements only to the person that
88. McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 796-98, 168 Cal. Rptr.
89, 93-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
89. Id. at 792, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 91. In MeKinney v. County of Santa Clara the defendant
had fired the plaintiff from the plaintiff's position as a probationary deputy sheriff for
unreported reasons. Id. The defendant's supervisors made allegedly defamatory statements in
reviewing the plaintiff's performance and announcing his dismissal. Id. Subsequently, the
plaintiff applied for work as a police officer at various police departments. Id.




94. Id. at 797-98, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
95. Id.
96. See id. (causal link between employer's defamatory statement and employee's injury
is not weakened by fact that employee communicated statement to third party because employee
compelled to communicate statement).
97. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing how courts that have
recognized compelled self-publication have reasoned similarly).
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the originator defames. 9 Additionally, each court recognized a long-standing
exception to the publication requirement. 99 According to these courts, if an
originator of defamatory statements reasonably could have foreseen that
circumstances would compel the defamed person to repeat the defamatory
statements to a third party, the originator is liable for publication after the
defamed person, under compulsion, actually communicates the statements
to a third party.'0
Because the compelled self-publication exception applies if a defamed
person is compelled to communicate statements to a third party, the courts,
like Lewis, reasoned that the exception applies to situations in which an
98. See McKinney, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 168 Cal. Rptr at 93 (originator of defamatory
statements generally is not liable for injury that results from defamatory statements if defamed
individual discloses contents of statement to third persons); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett,
73 Ga. App. 839, 839, 38 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1946) (same); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App.
452, , 168 N.W.2d 389, 405 (1969) (same); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United
States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 886 (Minn. 1986) (same).
99. See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 787, 796, 168 Cal. Rptr.
89, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that courts have developed exception to general rule
that originator is not liable for defamed person's republication of defamatory matter to third
persons); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 840, 38 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1946)
(same); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, -, 168 N.W.2d 389, 405 (1969) (same);
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 886 (Minn. 1986)
(same). Decisions recognizing compelled self-publication in an employee discharge context offer
two slightly different definitions of the "foreseeable republication" exception. For example,
the Colonial Stores and Grist courts recognized that the exception to the publication requirement
makes the originator of defamatory statements liable if the originator intended or had reason
to believe that, in the ordinary course of events, a third person would learn of the defamatory
statements. Colonial Stores, 73 Ga. App. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 307-08; Grist, 16 Mich. App.
at -, 168 N.W.2d at 405-06; see also supra notes 65-86 and accompanying text (discussing
Colonial Stores and Grist decisions). The McKinney and Lewis courts, however, recognized
that the compelled self-publication exception to the publication requirement applied if the
originator of defamatory statements could foresee that circumstances would compel the defamed
person to repeat the defamatory statements to third persons. McKinney, 110 Cal. App. 3d at
796, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94; Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886-88; see supra notes 46-63, 87-96 and
accompanying text (discussing Lewis and McKinney decisions). Although the Lewis and
McKinney decisions appear to impose a tougher foreseeability standard on plaintiff employees
than the Colonial Stores and Grist decisions impose, both standards led to identical results
when applied to an employment termination situation. See McKinney, 110 Cal. App. at 797-
798, 168 Cal. Rptr at 94-95 (former employer may be liable for defamation if employer can
foresee that prospective employers will require defamed employee to disclose former employer's
defamatory statements about reason for employee's discharge); Colonial Stores, 73 Ga. App.
at 840-41, 38 S.E.2d at 308 (same); Grist, 16 Mich. App. at -, 168 N.W.2d at 405 (same);
Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 886 (same). Since nearly every employer requires job applicants to
specify the reasons that the applicants left their previous employments, every discharging
employer should be able to foresee that prospective employers will compel a discharged
employee to reveal the reason that the employee left his employment with the discharging
employer. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 361 N.W.2d 875,
884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Forsberg, J., dissenting) (complaining that foreseeable compulsion
to republish reason for employee's dismissal occurs in almost every case of employee discharge).
100. McKinney, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 796, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94; Colonial Stores, 73
Ga. App. at 840, 38 S.E.2d at 307; Grist, 16 Mich. App. at -, 168 N.W.2d at 405; Lewis,
389 N.W.2d at 886.
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employer gives an employee a false and defamatory reason for the employ-
ee's discharge.' 0' Because most prospective employers ask job applicants the
reasons why the applicants left their previous jobs,I°2 an applicant who was
dismissed from his job most likely will have to inform a prospective employer
of the reason for his dismissal. 03 The applicant's only options if asked why
he left his previous employment are to inform the prospective employer of
the stated reason for his dismissal or to lie to the prospective employer.'
4
In determining that a prospective employer's request for the reason that an
applicant left his previous job does not compel the applicant to repeat to
prospective employers the reason that the applicant left his job, a court
implies that an applicant may lie to the prospective employers. 05 Public
policy, however, demands that courts not encourage job applicants to lie
to prospective employers.1l° Courts have determined that an employer who
discharges an employee should be able to foresee that prospective employers
will compel the employee to repeat the reasons that the employee left his
job.107 A discharging employer knows that other employers, as a routine
matter, will ask job applicants for the reasons the applicants left their
previous employment positions. 10s Recognizing that employers reasonably
can foresee that dismissed employees will repeat the statements the employers
made in dismissing the employees, these courts have held employers liable
101. See McKinney, 110 Cal. App. at 798, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95 (employer may be
liable for defamation if employer can foresee that circumstances will compel discharged
employee to disclose defamatory statements that employer made to employee to prospective
employers); Colonial Stores, 73 Ga. App. at 840-41, 38 S.E.2d at 308 (same); Grist, 16 Mich.
App. at -, 168 N.W.2d at 406 (same); Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888 (same).
102. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
896 (Minn. 1986) (Kelley, J., dissenting) (employers invariably ask job applicants for the
reasons why the applicants left their previous employment positions); Lewis v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 361 N.W.2d 875, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Forsberg,
J., dissenting) (same), aff'd in part, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
103. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888
(Minn. 1986).
104. Id.
105. Id. The Lewis court rejected the argument that employees have the option to lie if
prospective employers ask for the reasons for the employees' departures from the employees'
previous jobs. Id. The Lewis court expressly stated that, if prospective employers ask for the
reasons that employees left their previous jobs, the employees have no choice but to repeat
the defamatory reasons that the employees' former employers gave to the employees. Id. By
holding that circumstances compelled the employees to repeat the former employer's defamatory
statements because the employees could not lie about the reasons that the employees had left
their previous employment positions, the Lewis court implied that any court which holds that
similar circumstances do not compel employees to repeat the defamatory statements must base
its holding on a belief that the employees had the option to lie to prospective employers. Id.
106. Id.
107. McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 798, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89,
94-95; Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 840-41, 38 S.E.2d 306, 308; Grist v.
Upjohn Co., 16 Mich. App. 452, -, 168 N.W.2d 389, 405-06; Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
108. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 361 N.W.2d 875, 884
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Forsberg, J., dissenting), aff'd in part, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
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for defamation if the employers' statements are false and defamatory.' °9
Although some courts have allowed plaintiff employees to recover for
defamation if defendant employers could foresee that the employees would
disclose the defendant employers' defamatory statements to prospective
employers, not all courts have extended the foreseeable republication excep-
tion to the defamation publication requirement to the employment context. "0
For example, in Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 1 1 1 the Court of Appeals
for the State of Colorado rejected a fired employee's argument that, because
her employer reasonably could have foreseen that the discharged employee
would repeat to prospective employers allegedly defamatory statements the
employer made in discharging the employee, the employer should be liable
for defamation." 2 In Churchey a defendant employer told the plaintiff that
the defendant was firing the plaintiff for dishonesty." 3 The plaintiff asserted
109. See McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787,798, 168 Cal. Rptr.
89, 94-95 (employer may be liable for allegedly defamatory statements that employer com-
municates to discharged employee if employer reasonably can foresee that circumstances will
compel employee to repeat employer's statements to prospective employers); Colonial Stores,
73 Ga. App. 839, 840-41, 38 S.E.2d 306, 307-308 (same); Grist, 16 Mich. App. 452, ,
168 N.W.2d 389, 405-406 (same); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986) (same). If a discharged employee communicates to
prospective employers the allegedly defamatory reason that a former employer gave the
employee for the employee's dismissal, the former employer's original communication to the
employee is a negligent communication. See supra note 30 (discussing definition of negligent
communication). A negligent communication occurs if a defamer's conduct creates an unrea-
sonable risk that the defamatory matter will come to the attention of a third person.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 577 comment k (1977). A negligent communication satisfies
the defamation publication requirement as effectively as an intentional communication. Id.
Since employers know that prospective employers will ask job applicants for the reasons that
the applicants left their previous employments, a discharging employer who makes a defamatory
statement to an employee creates an unreasonable risk that the discharged employee will
communicate the statement to prospective employers. See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888 (discharging
employer could foresee that discharged employees would disclose employer's defamatory
statements about employees to prospective employers). Employers who give discharged em-
ployees defamatory reasons for the employees' dismissals, therefore, may be liable for defa-
mation if the employees repeat the defamatory reasons to prospective employers because the
employers "negligently communicated" the reasons to the employees. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 577 comment k (1977) (negligent communication satisfies defamation publi-
cation requirement).
110. See Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 725 P.2d 38, 41 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (finding
no reason to adopt exception to general requirement that defamer must publish defamatory
statements to third party in employment termination context); Lunz v. Neuman, 48 Wash. 2d
26, __, 290 P.2d 697, 701-702 (1955) (publication cannot occur if defendant communicates
defamatory material solely to plaintiff and plaintiff subsequently communicates material to
third persons). See generally infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (discussing decisions in
which courts have refused to hold former employers liable for defamation after discharged
employees disclosed to prospective employers defamatory statements that former employers
made to employees).
111. 725 P.2d 38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
112. Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 725 P.2d 38, 39 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
113. Id. In Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co. after the defendant fired the plaintiff, the
plaintiff appealed her dismissal to a five-member appeals board pursuant to company policy.
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that, after losing her job, no prospective employer would hire her after
requiring her to disclose that her former employer had discharged her for
dishonesty." 4 Like other courts, the Churchey court recognized that the
originator of defamatory statements generally is not liable for defamation
if the originator communicates the statements only to the defamed person
because the originator has not published the statements." 5 The Colorado
court noted that other jurisdictions had adopted a compelled self-publication
exception to the defamation publication requirement." 6 The Churchey court,
however, refused to hold former employers liable for a discharged employ-
ee's disclosure to prospective employers of the former employer's defamatory
statements." 7 The Colorado court perceived no reason for recognizing a
compelled self-publication exception to the publication requirement in em-
ployment termination situations." 8 The Churchey court, however, offered
Id. Company policy entitled the plaintiff to select two of the members of the appeals board.
Id. The appeal board, however, unanimously upheld the plaintiff's termination of her em-
ployment for dishonesty. Id.
114. Id. In Churchey the plaintiff claimed that, because each prospective employer's
application form contained a request for the reason that plaintiff had left her previous
employment, prospective employers compelled the plaintiff to disclose that a former employer
had discharged the plaintiff and to disclose the reason the former employer stated for the
discharge. Id.
115. Id. at 40.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 41. Like the Churchey court, the Supreme Court for the State of Washington,
in Lunz v. Neuman, refused to hold an employer liable for defamation after a discharged
employee stated in applications for employment that his former employer had fired the employee
for theft. Lunz v. Neuman, 48 Wash. 2d 26, -, 290 P.2d 697, 701-02 (1955). In Lunz a
defendant employer fired the plaintiff after the defendant confronted the plaintiff about
allegations that witnesses had seen the plaintiff removing groceries from the defendant's store
without paying for them. Id. at -, 290 P.2d at 699-701. The plaintiff testified that
prospective employers required the plaintiff to disclose the reason that the plaintiff had left
his previous employment. Id. at -, 290 P.2d at 701. The defendant argued that, because
the defendant never had published the allegedly defamatory statement to a third party, the
plaintiff could receive no damages for injuries that resulted from the plaintiff's publication of
the defendant's allegedly defamatory reason for firing the plaintiff. Id. The Lunz court
determined that the well-settled rule, that a defendant does not publish defamatory material
if the defendant communicates only to the defamed person, precluded an award of damages
to the plaintiff. Id. at -, 290 P.2d at 701-02. The Washington court, however, never
rejected the foreseeable republication exception to the general rule because the plaintiff never
presented the exception to the court for consideration. Id.
Although the Lunz court never considered any exception to the publication requirement,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, in Sarratore v. Longview
Van Corp., expressly considered whether to adopt the compelled self-publication doctrine.
Sarratore v. Longview Van Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1257, 1263-64 (N.D. Ind. 1987). Like the
Churchey court, the Sarratore court refused to apply the Lewis doctrine of compelled self-
publication to employment termination situations. Sarratore, 666 F. Supp. at 1264. The
Sarratore court, however, expressly decided not to reject the reasoning behind the doctrine.
Id. Instead, the Sarratore court refused to recognize the exception under Indiana law because,
absent clear evidence that the Indiana courts would recognize the compelled self-publication
exception to the defamation publication requirement, the district court was unwilling to usurp
the role of the Indiana courts in determining Indiana law. Id.
118. Churchey, 725 P.2d at 41.
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no basis for distinguishing employment termination situations from those
situations in which courts have held an originator of defamatory statements
liable for a defamed person's foreseeably compelled republications. n 9
Although the Churchey court failed to offer any reasons for rejecting
the compelled self-publication doctrine, critics of the doctrine argue that
the self-publication doctrine discourages discharged employees from miti-
gating the damages that occur if employees repeat their former employers'
defamatory statements about the employees' work performances. 120 These
critics have argued that, because a discharged employee can attempt to
contradict a former employer's defamatory statements by offering to pro-
spective employers a true account of the events surrounding his dismissal,
a discharged employee is in the best position to limit any injury his former
employer's defamatory statements may cause the employee.1 21 These critics
have argued that the availability of a compelled self-publication claim
removes the discharged employee's incentive to attempt to explain the true
story of his dismissal.12 2 Further, according to these critics, recognizing the
self-publication doctrine in employee discharge situations. unjustifiably will
increase employer liability for defamation. 23 Defamation suits brought by
discharged employees against their former employers presently account for
approximately one-third of all defamation actions. 24 Critics claim that courts
will increase the number of warrantless defamation claims by allowing
discharged employees to recover damages for statements that an employer
makes solely to a discharged employee.125
119. Id.
120. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
896 (Minn. 1986) (Kelley, J., dissenting) (recognition of compelled self-publication doctrine in
employment termination cases discourages plaintiffs from mitigating damages); Lewis v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 361 N.W.2d 875, 884 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (Forsberg, J., dissenting) (doctrine of self-publication inherently undermines mitigation
principle), aff'd in part, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
121. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 361 N.W.2d 875, 884
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Forsberg, J., dissenting), aff'd in part, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
122. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
896 (Kelley, J., dissenting) (any attempt to limit plaintiff's injury would work against plaintiff's
self-interest by lowering plaintiff's potential recovery); Lewis, 361 N.W.2d at 884 (Forsberg,
J., dissenting) (recognition of self-publication doctrine removes employee's incentive to con-
tradict defamatory statements).
123. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
896 (Kelley, J., dissenting) (reasoning that majority's holding ensures employers' liability in
all cases in which employers fired employees for any reason suggesting immorality, ineptness,
or improbity); Lewis, 361 N.W.2d at 884 (Forsberg, J., dissenting) (any termination based on
employee conduct or performance may give rise to defamation liability), aff'd in part, 389
N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); see also National L. J., May 4, 1987, at 30, col. 1 (discussing
comment that employers must view every wrongful discharge as potential defamation case);
Fired Employees, supra note 44 at 33, col. 4 (discussing argument that employers no longer
can fire employees without risking liability for defamation).
124. Fired Employees, supra note 43, at 33, col. 4.
125. See New Twist, supra note 43, at 17 (discussing argument that, in states that do not
recognize cause of action for wrongful discharge, discharged employees now will bring
defamation suits to circumvent judicial proscription against wrongful discharge claims).
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Although critics argue that courts unjustifiably will increase employer
liability by recognizing the compelled self-publication exception in employee
discharge situations, the Lewis court expressly determined that, if courts
properly limit the self-publication cause of action, employers will not have
to worry that employees would not mitigate damages or that employers'
liability unjustifiably would increase. 126 The Lewis court reasoned that courts
reasonably could ensure that plaintiffs would attempt to mitigate their
damages by requiring plaintiffs to make reasonable attempts to explain the
falsity of defamatory statements. 127 Addressing the issue of increased em-
ployer liability, the Lewis court asserted that plaintiffs could not manufac-
ture unwarranted causes of action if courts imposed liability on defendants
for plaintiffs' self-publication only when circumstances actually compelled
plaintiffs to repeat the defendants' defamatory remarks. 128 Recognition of
the compelled self-publication doctrine merely holds a defamer liable for
the injury his defamatory statement causes a defamed person. 29
In addition to the protections that proper limitation of the self-publi-
cation claim offers employers, employers possess a conditional privilege that
protects employers against defamation liability for statements the employers
make in discharging an employee.130 A conditional privilege protects a
privileged party from defamation liability unless the privileged party abuses
the privilege.'' In granting conditional privileges, courts have recognized
that the law must protect the free flow of information in certain situations,
even if the protection risks defamatory injury. 32 To protect the necessary
free flow of information between employers, courts have protected employ-
126. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888
(Minn. 1986).
127. See id. at 888 (plaintiffs, to mitigate their damages, only could attempt to explain
to prospective employers true facts of plaintiffs' dismissals).
128. Id. But see Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 361 N.W.2d
875, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (Forsberg, J., dissenting) (recognition of compelled self-
publication in employment discharge situations will result in litigation in almost every case of
employee discharge), aff'd in part, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
129. Id.
130. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 890.
131. See infra notes 134-138 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which employers
may lose their conditional privileges to defame employees).
132. See Iverson v. Frandsen, 237 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1956) (public policy exempts
certain communications from defamation liability as conditionally privileged); Coleman v.
Newark Morning Ledger Co., 29 N.J. 357, -, 149 A.2d 193, 203 (1959) (societal interest
in ensuring freedom of disclosure of individuals communicating information in protection of
self-interest or common interest mandates that courts grant conditional privileges to those
individuals' communications); Lathan v. Journal Co., 30 Wis. 2d 146, 152, 140 N.W.2d 417,
420 (1966) (by granting conditional privileges against defamation liability to certain commu-
nications, courts recognize social utility of encouraging free flow of information in those
communications). Generally, courts have granted a conditional privilege to communications in
which the speaker makes a statement in good faith and in discharge of a public or private
duty, or in matters in which the speaker has an interest. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON
Tnm LAw OF TORTS § 115, at 825 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 594-98 (1977);
50 AM. Jug. 2D § 195, at 698-99 (1970).
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ers from defamation liability for communications that the employers make
about former employees to prospective employers.' 33 Courts have protected
employers from liability for statements that the employers make about
former employees to ensure that the employers will provide accurate infor-
mation about the employees' qualifications. 34 If courts grant conditional
privileges to employers concerning communications to prospective employers
of the reasons for employees' dismissals, to maintain consistency, courts
also should protect employers from defamation liability for communications
that employers make directly to discharged employees. 13 By granting a
conditional privilege to employers for their statements to employees of the
reasons for the employees' dismissals, courts will protect employers from
unwarranted defamation liability.
36
While employers possess a conditional privilege against defamation
liability concerning statements that employers make in employment refer-
ences, courts have ruled that employers may lose this conditional privilege
if the employers abuse the privilege137 or if the employers act with malice. 3 8
An employer may abuse his conditional privilege by irrelevant, unreasonable
or excessive publication. 39 An employer acts with malice if he publishes an
133. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980) (former
employers' communications to prospective employers concerning employees deserve conditional
privileges to encourage former employers accurately to assess employees' qualifications); Calero
v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis.2d 487, , 228 N.W.2d 737, 744 (1975) (former employers'
communications about employees to prospective employers entitled to conditional privilege).
134. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980) (former
employers' communications to prospective employers concerning employees deserve conditional
privileges to encourage former employers accurately to assess employees' qualifications).
135. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
889-90 (Minn. 1986) (courts cannot consistently grant privilege to former employer's direct
statement to third parties while denying privilege to employer's statement to employee). The
sole distinction between an employer's direct statement to a prospective employer and a
statement to an employee that the employee subsequently repeats to the prospective employer
is the amount of control that the former employer exercises over the statements. See id. (sole
difference between two situations is mode of publication).
136. Id.
137. See Galvin v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 341 Mass. 293, -, 168 N.E.2d 262,
266 (1960) (employers lose their conditional privilege against defamation liability for statements
concerning employees if employers abuse privilege); Murphy v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp.,
45 N.J. Super. 478, -, 133 A.2d 34, 41 (1957) (same); Annotation, Defamation: Loss of
Employer's Qualified Privilege to Publish Employee's Work Record or Qualification, 24
A.L.R.4nA § 3, at 153 (1983) (same).
138. See Andrews v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 474 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (E.D. Ark. 1979)
(employer loses conditional privilege against defamation liability if malice motivates employer's
defamatory statements about employee); Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, -
,228 N.W.2d 737, 744 (same); Annotation, Defamation: Loss of Employer's Qualified Privilege
to Publish Employee's Work Record or Qualification, 24 A.L.R.4AT § 4, at 156 (same).
139. See Galvin v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 341 Mass. 293, -, 168 N.E.2d 262,
266 (1960) (employer abuses his conditional privilege against defamation liability for defamatory
statement about employee if employer publishes statement unnecessarily, unreasonably, or
excessively); Murphy v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 45 N.J. Super. 478, -, 133 A.2d 34,
41 (1957) (employee may prove that employer abused his conditional privilege against defa-
mation liability by showing that employer excessively published defamatory statements).
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employee reference in bad faith, with ill will, or for an improper motive1 4°
In the self-publication context, therefore, only employers who maliciously
make false statements in discharging employees should worry about losing
their privilege against defamation liability.'
4
1
Although a conditional privilege provides employers with a strong shield
against defamation liability, at least one commentator has argued that
employers are worried about more than simply prevailing at trial. 42 The
protections that a proper limitation of the compelled self-publication excep-
tion and a conditional privilege offer to employers do not shield employers
from the costs of mounting expensive defenses to warrantless suits or settling
claims of unworthy plaintiffs.143 Many employers already have ceased to
exchange reference information about former employees because of the
potential threat of and expense in defending against employee defamation
lawsuits. 44 Because of decisions like Lewis, many employers now refuse to
communicate to anyone, even a discharged employee, the reasons for the
employee's discharge. 45 Employers complain that the limited exchange of
information about employees weakens the ability of prospective employers
to make informed hiring decisions.
46
140. See Andrews v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 474 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (E.D. Ark. 1979)
(employer acts with malice if, in defaming employee, employer acts with hate, vindictiveness,
spite, or reckless disregard of employee's rights); Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487,
, 228 N.W.2d 737, 744 (1975) (employer loses conditional privilege if employer makes
defamatory statements about employee motivated by ill will, spite, revenge, or other bad
motive).
141. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 361 N.W.2d 875,
881 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (recognition of self-publication threatens only those employers
whose communications to discharged employees are dishonest and malicious), aff'd in part,
389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
142. See Comment, Speak No Evil: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts Self-Publication
Defamation: Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 71 MirN. L. Rav.
1092, 1105 n.67 (1987) (arguing that Lewis court, in holding that careful limiting of self-
publication cause of action would limit extension of employer liability and not deter employer
communication, failed to understand how its decision would affect pretrial stages of litigation).
143. See id. (unwarranted ancillary claim of self-publication defamation could force higher
settlement amount between employer and employee).
144. See Fired Employees, supra note 43, at 33, col. 4 (many companies are sharply
restricting information that companies provide about former employees because companies
desire to avoid costs and aggravation of defamation suits); National L. J., May 4, 1987, at
30, col. 1 (threat of defamation lawsuits has chilled traditional exchange of information
between employers). Because of increased employer liability for defamation, prospective em-
ployers do not check the references of approximately seventy-five percent of their job applicants.
National L. J., May 4, 1987, at 30, col. 1.
145. National L. J., May 4, 1987, at 30, col. 1.
146. See Fired Employees, supra note 43, at 33, col. 4 (reduction of available information
concerning job applicants prevents prospective employers from screening out incompetent and
dishonest applicants). One commentator claims that the lack of adequate reference information
causes financial institutions unwittingly to hire unqualified applicants and causes a high turnover
of employees. See id. (discussing ramifications of reduction in reference information in labor
marketplace). Additionally, a defense contractor has reported to a senate subcommittee that
employers' fear of defamation suits has allowed workers to conceal past employment problems
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Although a limited exchange of information about employees adversely
affects hiring decisions, recognition of the self-publication exception to the
publication requirement should not affect the flow of information between
employers because the compelled self-publication exception applies solely to
situations in which an employer communicates a defamatory statement to
a discharged employee, not to a prospective employer. 147 Furthermore, courts
grant employers a conditional privilege against defamation liability expressly
to protect the flow of information between employers and to protect
employers from warrantless claims. 48 Employers' arguments that compelled
self-publication claims inhibit communication are really complaints that the
employers' conditional privilege insufficiently protects the flow of infor-
mation between employers.
In response to the threat of defamation liability from recognition of
the compelled self-publication doctrine, many employers may cease giving
employees the reason for the employees' dismissals. 49 Neither employers
nor discharged employees will benefit if employers silently discharge em-
ployees. 5 ° Seemingly arbitrary dismissals will frustrate employees and lower
worker morale in general.15 1 Because lower morale results in lower produc-
tivity and efficiency, employers also will suffer from a non-explanatory
approach to employee dismissals. 52 Some attorneys and consultants have
advised their corporate clients to avoid defamation litigation by helping
discharged employees find subsequent employment through "outplacement
counseling."'15 3 Not only does placement limit the damages that the dis-
charged employee may suffer, but discharged employees who find subsequent
employment are less likely to sue former employers than discharged em-
ployees who do not find work. 54 Although the outplacement approach
might help to prevent some self-publication claims, discharged employees
and obtain jobs in the defense industry that the workers could not have obtained had prospective
employers known about the past problems. See id. (discussing effect of employee defamation
suits on hiring in defense industry).
147. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text (describing situations in which self-
publication defamation occurs in employment discharge context).
148. See supra notes 130-41 and accompanying text (discussing employers' conditional
privilege against defamation liability for statements that employers make about employees).
149. See Fired Employees, supra note 44, at 33, col. 4 (employers may respond to the
self-publication cause of action by refusing to tell employees the reasons for employees'
dismissals).
150. See Comment, Speak No Evil: The Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts Self-Publication
Defamation: Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 71 MmiN. L. REv.,
1092, 1113 (both employers and employees will suffer if employers cease to inform employees
of reasons for employees' dismissals).
151. Id. If an employer discharges an employee, without informing him of the reason for
the dismissal, the employee may become suspicious and insecure, believing that any subsequent
employer also may fire him for some unknown reason. Id.
152. Id.
153. National L. J., May 4, 1987, at 30, col. 4.
154. See Fired Employees, supra note 43, at 33, col. 4 (discharged employees who find
new jobs are unlikely to sue former employers).
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will continue to receive questions from prospective employers about the
employees' reasons for leaving past employment. As a result of the limita-
tions of the "silent discharge" and "outplacement counseling" approaches,
a better alternative for employers might be for employers to adopt discipli-
nary systems that carefully document any negative charges that employers
obtain concerning employees, corroborate any action the employers take
against employees, and ensure honesty in employer communications to
discharged employees. 55 An employer is not liable for defamation if the
employer makes only true statements about the a discharged employee, even
if the true statements are injurious to the employee's reputation.15 6 Fur-
thermore, if an employer can show that he attempted to verify his reason
for firing an employee, the employer is unlikely to be guilty of malice
because the employer neither was indifferent to the truth nor acted with a
bad motive. 5 7 If an employer does not abuse his conditional privilege
against defamation liability, the employer retains his privilege and will not
be liable for statements the employer made to or about the employee. 8
Although the doctrine of self-publication initially appears radically to
extend employers' liability, the doctrine, in actual practice, merely applies
to employment termination situations a long-recognized exception to the
defamation publication requirement.159 By recognizing the compelled self-
publication doctrine, courts allow discharged employees to hold their former
employers responsible for injuries that the employers have caused by mali-
ciously making false and defamatory statements to employees. 60 If courts
properly limit the compelled self-publication cause of action, the cause of
action should not subject employers to unwarranted liability.' 6' Employer
response to the self-publication doctrine will be crucial in determining
whether the self-publication doctrine will impact positively on relations
between employers and employees. If employers respond to the self-publi-
cation doctrine by refusing to communicate to employees the reasons for
the employees' dismissals, both employers and employees will suffer from
155. See Martin & Bartol, Potential Libel and Slander Issues Involving Discharged
Employees, 13 EiPLOYEE RELATIONS L. J. 43, 59 (1987) (identifying eight steps that employer
can take to reduce risk of liability when employer discharges employee).
156. See supra note 3 (plaintiff has defamation cause of action if defendant makes
defamatory statements that are false).
157. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (discussing ways employer can abuse
conditional privilege).
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 47, 101-09 and accompanying text (discussing manner in which
compelled self-publication cause of action fits within recognized exception to publication
requirement).
160. See supra notes 126-29, 141 and accompanying text (discussing how employers who
act in good faith need not worry about compelled self-publication liability).
161. See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text (proper limits on self-publication
doctrine will prevent employees from using doctrine to recover for warrantless defamation
claims against former employers).
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the lack of communication. 6 2 Because the self-publication doctrine, however,
threatens only employers who maliciously make false and defamatory state-
ments to discharged employees, recognition of the doctrine only should
cause employers to take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of statements
that the employers make to and about employees. 163 The potential problems
that the doctrine of compelled self-publication may cause do not justify
denying injured employees what may be their only means of redress against
employers who have wronged them.
CHARLES S. MURRAY, JR.
ADDENDUM
On August 8, 1988, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Colorado Court of Appeals on the issue of compelled self-publication
in Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., No. 86SC183 (Colo. Aug. 8, 1988)
(WESTLAW, CO-CS Database). In Churchey the Colorado Supreme Court
held that a defamation plaintiff may establish the element of publication
with self-publication if the plaintiff proves that the defendant could have
foreseen that the plaintiff would have been under a strong compulsion to
publish the defamatory statement. Id. The Colorado Court also stated that
a conditional privilege protects an employer for statements that the employer
makes to an employee when discharging the employee. Id. The Churchey
court held, however, that a plaintiff employee can overcome this privilege
by proving that the employer knew the statement was false or acted in
reckless disregard of the statement's veracity. Id. As a result of the Churchey
decision, every court that expressly has considered the self-publication cause
of action in the context of employee discharges has recognized the cause of
action.
162. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (if employers cease to inform employees
of reasons for employees' dismissals, both employers and employees will suffer).
163. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (recognition of compelled self-publication
doctrine threatens only those employers who make false and malicious statements to discharged
employees).
